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DARE TO BE DIFFERENT? CONFORMITY VS. DIFFERENTIATION IN CORPORATE 
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE FIRMS 
AND MARKET RESPONSES
ABSTRACT
Building on the literature on optimal distinctiveness, this study explores the effects of conformity 
and differentiation in corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices on the evaluations by security 
analysts and the responses of the financial market in general. We develop the argument that while 
conformity in CSR scope enhances analyst coverage, differentiation in CSR emphasis leads to more-
favorable analyst recommendations and higher market value. This suggests that firms may be able to 
simultaneously conform in CSR scope and differentiate in CSR emphasis to achieve optimal 
distinctiveness. To further enhance our understanding of the variation in the relationship between 
conformity/differentiation and the response of analysts and the market, we investigate how some 
firm- and analyst-level factors moderate this relationship. Using the case of corporate social activities 
of Chinese listed firms during the period from 2008 to 2014, we show that scope conformity has a 
stronger effect on analyst coverage for state-owned firms and firms with higher visibility; on the 
other hand, the relationship between emphasis differentiation and analyst recommendation/market 
value strengthens for firms covered by high-status brokerage houses but weakens for those 
experiencing high earnings pressure. 
Keywords: optimal distinctiveness, corporate social responsibility, securities analysts
INTRODUCTION
Organization and management researchers have long been puzzled by a core paradox—how 
firms can strategically manage the dual pressures of conforming to the institutional pressure to gain 
basic legitimacy while forging unique or differentiated identities to achieve a competitive advantage 
(e.g., Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Deephouse, 1999; Durand & Kremp, 2016; 
White, 2010). The notion of optimal distinctiveness provides a useful conceptual focal point to 
synthesize a diverse literature on this common problem. Grounded in the strategic balance 
perspective that views conformity and differentiation as competing demands, much extant research 
on firm-level optimal distinctiveness focuses on one single, static convergence point where the 
legitimate distinctiveness of a firm is maximized (see Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017, for a 
review). This focus usefully captures a typical way through which firms balance the tension between 
conformity versus differentiation when dealing with fine-grained or well-recognized issues and 
practices (Brewer, 1991; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Deephouse, 1999). 
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However, there are two important gaps in the optimal distinctiveness literature that have not 
been adequately addressed. The first reflects some recent developments in the field (e.g., Zhao et al., 
2017) that suggest that a single balancing point between conformity and differentiation, while very 
useful, is ill-suited for capturing the variety of strategies firms could employ to achieve optimal 
distinctiveness. While existing studies provide some implications for research to move beyond a 
single balancing point, they are often not directly targeted toward the optimal distinctiveness field, 
and their discussions often encompass very-broad strategy topics (Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 
2013; Zhao et al., 2017). For example, Bowen, Siehl, and Schneider (1989) suggest that firms with 
similar products (implying conformity in product offering) may differentiate through customer 
service. Miller, Breton-Miller, and Lester (2013) argue that family ownership as a differentiated 
governance form may be more accepted when the firm conforms in other strategic behaviors. The 
focus on orchestration across multiple strategies in broad categories (e.g., customer service vs. 
product offering; ownership vs. other strategic behaviors) makes researchers omit the complexity 
within a single strategy dimension (practice) and thus overlook the possibility of orchestrating 
conformity and differentiation across multiple features within a single practice.  
The second gap in the extant literature is that there is little understanding about variation across 
firms in their demands for conformity vs. differentiation, and subsequently in the effectiveness of 
their conformity vs. differentiation efforts in influencing market responses. While certain conformity 
vs. differentiation choices may be optimal for some firms, they may be suboptimal for others due to 
differences across firms in organizational features or the industry/institutional contexts in which the 
firms operate (King, Clemens, & Fry, 2011). It is thus imperative to contextualize discussions of 
optimal distinctiveness by examining conditions under which demands for conformity or 
differentiation may vary and conformity/differentiation may have differential impacts on firm 
outcomes.
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This study aims to address both gaps. First, we recognize the possibility of orchestrating 
conformity and differentiation across multiple features within a single but complex practice. In 
particular, building on but also extending the recent development in optimal distinctiveness literature 
(Brewer, 1991; Durand & Kremp, 2016; Zhao et al., 2017; Zuckerman, 2016), we explore a specific 
way that conformity and differentiation can be achieved simultaneously along two different elements 
of a practice in the context of Chinese firms’ corporate social practices. The two elements of CSR 
strategies are: (1) the scope dimension that captures the number of different CSR fields covered by a 
focal firm, and (2) the emphasis dimension that assesses how much effort has been allocated by a 
focal firm in each CSR field. We argue that the scope dimension of CSR is associated with the 
legitimacy of a firm’s social practice because the scope dimension represents a prototype with a 
material-like feature that audiences often find convenient to refer to when making judgments 
regarding legitimacy (Durrand, Granqvist, & Tyllström, 2017; Zhao, Ishihara, Jennings, & 
Lounsbury, 2018). On the other hand, the emphasis dimension of CSR is more abstract, allowing 
firms to choose different focuses that make a firm’s CSR practice more unique as compared to that 
of their peers. This contrast between the two CSR dimensions is often reinforced by regulatory 
agencies, which typically institutionalize CSR practices by designating the issue fields that need to 
be covered but leave the emphasis dimension unspecified. We thus posit that firms can potentially 
achieve optimal distinctiveness by conforming in CSR scope but differentiating in CSR emphasis. 
By linking firms’ CSR strategies to organizational outcomes, as reflected in the response of 
important audiences including security analysts and financial markets in general, we argue and 
hypothesize that CSR conformity in the scope dimension legitimizes firms among the community of 
analysts, positively influencing analyst coverage. In contrast, CSR differentiation in the emphasis 
dimension allows greater value-creation opportunities, leading to more-favorable analyst 
recommendations and superior firm market performance.   
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To address the second gap, we explore contingency factors that influence the effectiveness of 
firms’ conformity and differentiation efforts. We argue that the relationship between CSR scope 
conformity and analyst coverage varies with the level of legitimacy pressures that firms face, which 
typically come from two sources: government/regulatory parties, and the general stakeholders/public. 
Accordingly, we examine the moderating roles of two critical firm-level factors, state ownership and 
firm visibility, which are likely to influence legitimacy pressure from the government/regulatory 
parties and the general public respectively. On the other hand, the relationship between CSR 
emphasis differentiation and analyst recommendation (market value) is influenced more by the 
extent that firms’ differentiation efforts are appreciated and valued by market audiences. In 
particular, we argue that the effectiveness of firms’ CSR differentiation can be conditioned by the 
extent to which analysts appreciate and/or have the ability to evaluate such efforts, as reflected in 
high-status houses coverage, and firm earnings pressure respectively. 
These issues were examined using a sample of Chinese public listed firms from 2008 to 2014, a 
period during which many Chinese companies adopted the CSR concept. China’s integration into the 
global economy has facilitated the diffusion of CSR practices, with consumers and investors 
increasingly using their purchasing power and capital to encourage socially responsible behaviors. 
CSR practices thus allow Chinese firms to better understand and address the concerns of their 
stakeholders and explore new ways to achieve sustainable development. Meanwhile, the role of 
government in promoting CSR has also been heightened. The Chinese government considers CSR to 
be consistent with the general political initiative of building a harmonious society. Like some of its 
counterparts in Canada, South Africa, and Europe (European Commission, 2014), government 
agencies in China provided broad CSR guidelines for firms that specified the scope of socially 
responsible corporate conduct but not the standards or priorities of different issue fields (Luo, Wang, 
& Zhang, 2017; Marquis & Qian, 2014). This pressures firms to conform but also offers the 
Page 5 of 52 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
opportunity for firms to differentiate CSR activities based on their own unique features. Thus the 
China CSR context, with clear reporting guidelines emphasizing scope but leaving emphasis 
unregulated, makes the contrast between scope and emphasis more salient. The empirical context 
thus allows us to show more clearly how we can move beyond a single optimal balancing point for 
conformity and differentiation in the adoption of a complex practice.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Optimal Distinctiveness and the Complexity of Corporate Social Practices
The pursuit of optimal distinctiveness is a critical aspect of organizational life. The competing 
pressure to be legitimate and distinctive is important and persistent, exerting significant influence on 
firms’ formulation of effective corporate strategies (Durand & Kremp, 2016; Zhao et al., 2017). 
While earlier studies in the area focus on finding one single, static convergence point in which the 
legitimate distinctiveness of a firm is maximized (Deephouse, 1999; Roberts & Amit, 2003; Stephan, 
Murmann, Boeker, & Goodstein, 2003), Zhao et al. (2017) point out that such an approach may not 
be appropriate because organizational environments are multiplex, fragmented, and dynamic. In 
order to move beyond this single balancing-point solution, firms may adopt an orchestration 
strategy,1 i.e., to configure different responses across various aspects of strategies to achieve optimal 
distinctiveness (Zhao et al., 2017). However, research along this line has not been directly targeted 
toward the problem of optimal distinctiveness; moreover, the discussion of orchestration mainly rests 
on the complex features of organizational environments (King et al., 2011). Building directly on and 
extending the optimal distinctiveness literature, we argue that firms may also be able to derive 
multiple strategic responses from the complexity of practice itself instead of that of the environment. 
1 In the review paper by Zhao et al. (2017), the authors propose three ways that future study can go beyond one single 
balancing point: orchestration (across multiple strategic dimensions in a complex environment), stakeholder multiplicity 
(multiple demands of diverse stakeholders), and managing temporality (temporally shifting legitimacy and differentiation 
expectations in dynamic environments). In this paper we focus on orchestration since the other two dimensions are not 
relevant to our discussion.  
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In other words, it is possible to simultaneously achieve conformity and differentiation within one 
specific practice or strategic dimension. 
In the case of corporate social practices, recent discussions on how firms undertake their social 
responsibilities seem to have evolved into two streams of argument: the institutional perspective and 
the strategic perspective. Work in the institutional tradition posits that firms engage in socially 
responsible activities to meet stakeholders’ expectations and conform to socially constructed values 
and norms (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Petersen & Vredenburg, 2009). Thus firms may find it 
necessary to adopt and retain institutionalized CSR structures, procedures, or personnel to signal 
normativity, credibility, and legitimacy to outside audiences (Marquis & Qian, 2014; McWilliams, 
Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Zbaracki, 1998). As more countries realize the necessity of enhancing the 
awareness of social responsibility in the business communities, various standards and national action 
plans are formulated to integrate, disseminate, or shape the more-generic global CSR approaches 
within their national policy framework (European Commission, 2014). Therefore pressure to 
conform from national governments becomes increasingly more relevant for firms operating in both 
emerging and developed economies. 
Work from the strategic perspective stresses the value of adopting unique social practices, with 
the aim of ultimately achieving positive financial outcomes for the firm (Elsbach, 1994; Harjoto & 
Jo, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2007; Zhang & Galletta, 2006). According to this perspective, instead of 
conforming to institutional pressure and becoming similar to their peers, firms benefit most by 
differentiating themselves from their peers through differentiating their social activities based on 
unique firm strategies and operations, and more effectively addressing the particular needs of its 
customers and other stakeholders (Bouwman, Frishkoff, & Frishkoff, 1987; Deephouse, 1999; 
Durand & Calori, 2006; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; White, 2010). Differentiated CSR activities may 
help firms obtain new resources and develop capabilities that are internally related to the know-how 
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and organizational culture, and strengthen relationships with key stakeholders (Francis & Armstrong, 
2003; Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015; Nicolai, Schulz, & Thomas, 2010). Therefore differentiation in 
CSR enables firms to discover unique opportunities and strengthen their competitive position, 
thereby bringing benefits to both society and themselves (Barney, 1991; Porter & Kramer, 2007).
It appears that there is an apparent tension between conformity in CSR to meet the need for 
legitimacy and firms’ search for uniqueness or differentiation in CSR in order to reap CSR-based 
competitive advantages. However, what has been overlooked in the literature is that in the 
management of complex practices such as CSR managers may be able to orchestrate across different 
dimensions of the practice so as to achieve synergy between conformity and differentiation. More 
specifically, CSR represents a more-integrated management philosophy rather than a clearly defined, 
standardized operating procedure or governance principle (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 
2006). It involves interactions with multiple groups of stakeholders and is thus multidimensional in 
nature and generally complex; it thus creates room for firms to orchestrate their strategic responses 
along different dimensions and make it possible to achieve optimal distinctiveness by conforming in 
one dimension (scope) but differentiating in another (emphasis). 
The classification of the two dimensions—scope vs. emphasis—is based on some recent 
communication and management studies that propose that firms’ implementation of complex 
practices can be characterized along the two dimensions (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Fiss, Kennedy, 
& Davis, 2012; Philippe & Durand, 2011; Yuan, Fulk, & Monge, 2007). The scope dimension 
captures variation in terms of scope or the number of elements adopted by a firm. This dimension 
indicates how far a firm’s implementation presents far-reaching or restricted efforts toward full 
adoption. In other words, it measures the dosage of the practice being adopted and is closer to the 
notion of a scale of implementation (Ansari et al., 2010; Durand & Kremp, 2016; Fiss et al., 2012). 
The emphasis dimension captures the extent to which a firm’s practice appears to be unique as 
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compared to the commonly adopted practice, reflecting the efforts of an organization to differentiate 
their practice in specific fields (Ansari et al., 2010; Deephouse, 1999; Litov, Moreton, & Zenger, 
2012; Yuan et al., 2007). Given the complexity of CSR in terms of both its multidimensional nature 
and variations in content or depth (Philippe & Durand, 2011), it is appropriate to describe firms’ 
CSR practices along the scope and emphasis dimensions. The scope dimension captures the extent to 
which a firm covers a wide range of CSR issues such as environmental protection, labor practices, 
product quality and safety, and fair operating practice. The emphasis dimension reflects the content 
of a firm’s specific CSR activities, or the extent to which a firm’s pattern of CSR emphasis deviates 
from the common patterns of other firms. It thus indicates the uniqueness of firms’ CSR practice as 
compared to their peer group.
The Role of Chinese Security Analysts and Financial Markets
A firm’s optimal distinctiveness depends on a constant interaction between managerial agency 
and the evaluations of external audiences. We next examine how firms conforming or differentiating 
their CSR strategies affects certain important organizational outcomes, particularly in terms of the 
responses of security analysts and financial markets in general. 
Security analysts are considered a representative audience whose evaluations of organizational 
practices have important implications for firm strategy and performance (Luo, Wang, Raithel, & 
Zheng, 2015; White, 2010). Beginning in the early 1990s, there has been growing interest in firms’ 
social activities among the community of investors and analysts. In an early survey 26 percent of 
U.S. investors said that a company’s business practices and ethics were extremely important to their 
investment decisions, and 72 percent claimed to consider a company’s ethics when deciding whether 
to invest in its stock. These data suggest that investors recognize that stakeholders’ concerns can 
translate into financial consequences for the companies in which they invest (Paine, 2003). As of 
2018, more than 2,250 institutions with $80 trillion in assets under management endorsed the United 
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Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) and committed to six principles including 
“to incorporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues into investment analysis and 
the decision making process; to promote acceptance and implementation of the principles within the 
investment industry.”2 An increasing body of finance and accounting literature suggests that CSR 
reporting is an important source of nonmarketing information disclosure (Cronqvist & Yu, 2017; 
Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017), and analysts have been learning to distinguish different types of 
CSR activities and establish a criteria to evaluate whether firms’ CSR efforts can contribute to their 
future performance (Khan et al., 2016).
The corporate social responsibility system was introduced in China during the late 1990s. 
China’s integration into the global economy through trade and institutional participation was 
accompanied by the importation of global social norms. A growing number of foreign buyers and 
multinational companies who demand labor rights protection, better product quality, and greener 
products have raised the awareness of Chinese suppliers about the balance between profit 
maximization and enhancement of social standards, best practices, and morality (Yin & Zhang, 
2012). Similar to national governments in other continents, the Chinese government has been 
actively promoting CSR as a way to build a harmonious society. As part of the national-level action 
plan, in 2006 the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued the first detailed CSR reporting guideline, which 
required its listed firms to engage in social practices according to a comprehensive framework. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the nation’s top regulator of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
subsequently adopted similar regulatory guidelines (SASAC, 2008). Meanwhile, some third-party 
rating agencies such as Runling began publishing CSR ratings and systematically comparing firms’ 
CSR practices in a list of issue fields. Chinese firms have consequently experienced increasing 
2 Detailed information about UNPRI can be found at https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri.
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pressure to meet institutional demands in CSR and have thus become more and more active in 
responding to the CSR requirements. 
The systematic introduction of the CSR system among Chinese firms has also had reverberations 
in China’s investment community. Like their counterparts in developed economies, Chinese 
investors and analysts began to seriously consider the social practices of listed firms (Koh, Qian, & 
Wang, 2014). Some recent financial studies indicate that Chinese investors are increasingly 
incorporating the social performance of a firm into their investment decisions (e.g., Hung, Shi, & 
Wang, 2013). Furthermore, interviews and survey data show that the majority of analysts monitor 
firms’ CSR activities and consider firms’ social performance in their reports (SynTao, 2009). 
Similarly, there has been increasing interaction between firms and analysts regarding corporate 
social activities. For instance, our field interviews suggest that Chinese firms often invite security 
analysts to attend so-called “be-in-touch meetings” in which managers introduce and explain their 
new projects and CSR practices to attract analysts’ attention. CSR is increasingly becoming a critical 
precondition for meeting the expectations of the Chinese government and public, resulting in 
analysts frequently taking the social performance of firms into consideration. 
We suggested earlier that firms’ CSR practices can be described along the scope and emphasis 
dimensions. In the sections below we develop the argument that due to its relatively more material 
and salient features, the scope dimension of CSR is likely to be closely associated with the judgment 
of the legitimacy of firms’ social practices. In contrast, due to its abstract nature, the emphasis 
dimension of CSR provides room for differentiation and is thus primarily associated with the value 
of such practices. In addition, previous studies in behavioral accounting and sociology suggest that 
analysts’ decision-making processes are often characterized by two distinct yet interconnected goals 
(Bouwman et al., 1987; De Graaf & Slager, 2006; Zuckerman, 1999): evaluating the basic legitimacy 
of firms, and then estimating the distinctiveness of its strategy or product that affects a firm’s future 
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market value. Building on these premises, we argue that firms achieve optimal distinctiveness in 
CSR by conforming in the scope dimension, which attracts analyst coverage, but differentiating in 
the emphasis dimension, which leads to better analyst recommendation and higher market value.
CSR Scope Conformity and Analyst Coverage
In order to obtain basic legitimacy in the financial market, public firms often seek entry into 
relations with security analysts, and present the analysts with different “offers” in an attempt to win 
their favor. Due to the complexity associated with CSR practices, outside observers such as security 
analysts often have difficulty measuring and assessing the extent of firms’ social activities (Aguilera 
et al., 2006). 
Complex and multidimensional practices often have both material and abstract features. The 
material features such as shape, size, product design, or social codes induce a prototypical 
categorization (Durrand et al., 2017; Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). When a prototype is 
available for characterizing a practice, audiences often refer to the prototype in evaluating the 
legitimacy of the practice. This is because prototypes offer a clearly identifiable attribute that enables 
audiences to easily observe and incorporate it into their evaluations. In contrast, activities deviating 
from the prototype likely induce cognitive ambiguity that leads to audiences being less able to 
understand the intended meaning (Zuckerman, 1999) and thus not recognizing them as legitimate 
(Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2012; Hsu & Hannan, 2005). 
This reasoning is in line with the arguments and findings in the behavioral accounting literature 
on analysts’ decision-making processes. Bouwman and colleagues (1987) empirically examine 
analysts’ decision-making process using experimental methods. They determine that analysts usually 
use processes and strategies that are designed to extract the relevant activities with minimum effort 
when facing large amounts of data (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). The model of analysts’ evaluation 
shows two distinct phases: familiarizing and reasoning. The goal of the first phase, which is closely 
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related to analyst coverage decisions, is to determine the extent to which firms’ practices in certain 
fields meet the established guidelines or conventions. This phase reflects the checklist or prototype 
used to develop a feel for the firm. These checklists are similar to the standard templates that help 
professionals categorize the problems at hand and evaluate the legitimacy of a given practice 
(Durand & Paolella, 2013; Durrand et al., 2017). In the case of CSR practice, the checklist or 
prototype is largely reflected in the scope of social practices, i.e., the extent to which a firm covers a 
wide range of social issues (e.g., environment, employee health and safety, product quality, and 
philanthropy). Indeed, the scope dimension in regard to whether or not a firm has covered a certain 
social issue field is easily identifiable, and much more overt compared to the emphasis dimension. 
Moreover, as described earlier, in the context of China the state and other regulatory agencies 
have provided specific guidelines regarding the appropriate structure of CSR practices. This further 
heightens the extent to which a firm conforms to the scope-based prototype as the basis for analysts 
to determine its legitimacy. We thus expect that compared to the emphasis dimension, the CSR scope 
dimension is likely to play a dominant role in analysts’ evaluating the conformity in firms’ CSR 
practices. That said, we do not intend to argue that CSR is the only criterion for analysts’ coverage 
decisions. Indeed, strategic and operational issues that have a direct effect on a firm’s survival and 
economic performance are often the primary considerations in analysts’ decisions to cover a firm 
(White, 2010). However, we contend that in addition to key strategic and operational considerations, 
conformity in CSR practices is an important and also essential criterion that analysts use to decide 
whether to cover a firm. This is true in general across different economies, with mounting pressure 
from various parties, including investors, on corporate executives to make CSR an integral part of 
corporate strategy (Cronqvist & Yu, 2017; Lins et al., 2017). This pressure is felt not only by firms 
but also by analysts in their decisions regarding whether or not to cover particular firms. According 
to one analyst we interviewed, “The first thing that I check with the corporate activities is whether 
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they are in line with the regulatory guidelines, including those associated with social practices.” We 
thus hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The scope conformity of firms’ CSR practices to established reporting 
guidelines positively affects analyst coverage.
Although most Chinese firms face pressures regarding legitimacy and thus need to conform to 
standard CSR practices, the level of pressure they face can vary significantly. Thus analysts’ 
coverage evaluations are likely to be influenced by considering the variation in such pressures. For 
example, analysts may still cover a firm that faces less legitimacy pressure even if the firm shows a 
lower level of CSR conformity. Chinese firms’ legitimacy pressures typically come from two 
sources: government/regulatory parties, and the general stakeholders/public. Accordingly, we discuss 
two critical firm-level factors—state ownership and firm visibility—that are likely to influence the 
amount of legitimacy pressure that firms face from the government/regulatory parties and the general 
stakeholders or public respectively.
In the context of the Chinese economy, the government and its associated regulatory parties are 
important sources of legitimacy (Wang & Qian, 2011). Historically, SOEs have typically been 
regarded as important providers of various social services. Besides economic profitability, the 
Chinese government has other interests in SOEs, such as supplying scarce inputs for other 
enterprises, maintaining a high level of employment, and providing various other social services to 
employees and communities. Although this relationship has been significantly weakened by the 
governance reforms in the state sector in recent years, the Chinese government still has strong 
nonfinancial interests in SOEs compared to other forms of enterprises. 
The Chinese government can exert both normative and regulative pressure to promote firms’ 
adoption of certain practices. Compared to other firms, SOEs are more heavily influenced by the 
government: they receive support or institutional protection from the government agencies that either 
founded them or have considerable ownership in them, and the appointment of top management is 
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tightly controlled by the government. SOEs are thus under the direct influence of the government, 
and consequently feel more pressure to respond to the call of its regulatory agencies (Marquis & 
Qian, 2014). In the case of CSR, although all Chinese companies are encouraged to enhance their 
social performance the listed SOEs are among the first wave of firms that are required to 
systematically adopt the CSR guidelines established by the government (Gao, 2011). 
Therefore, compared to private firms SOEs face greater legitimacy pressures from the 
government and regulatory agencies regarding CSR practices. Such pressures are also likely to be 
reflected in analysts’ coverage decisions. As suggested by some previous studies, when evaluating 
SOEs analysts suffer from more-serious information asymmetries since the performance of SOEs is 
much less predictable according to normal business cycles, owing to the government’s influence 
(Cantor & Packer, 1997). They thus place greater focus on more-observable conformity actions of 
SOEs but become cautious with any unusual practices, especially with those that obviously deviate 
from government requirements. Accordingly, when deciding whether to cover an SOE as compared 
to a private firm, the analysts are likely to pay greater attention to CSR conformity. We thus have:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): State ownership moderates the relationship between CSR scope 
conformity and analyst coverage such that the postulated relationship is stronger among SOEs 
than it is among non-SOEs.
Firms may experience legitimacy pressure not only from the government but also from other 
firm stakeholders and the general public (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). This is especially the case for 
firms with high visibility. Greater visibility is a double-edged sword for managers. On the one hand, 
high visibility is generally associated with more-positive responses from firms’ stakeholders, 
including favorable evaluations from investors and the media, and customers’ willingness to pay a 
price premium (Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). In regard to 
CSR, high-visibility firms clearly have some advantage in making their social activities known to the 
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public. Indeed, greater firm visibility has been found to increase the benefit that a firm can obtain 
from their social activities (Wang & Qian, 2011). On the other hand, a firm with high visibility is 
also likely to raise the expectations of stakeholders, resulting in heightened legitimacy pressure. The 
research points out that stakeholders who are more informed about a firm’s activities are also more 
likely to take action against the firm. As a consequence, more-visible organizations are subject to 
greater levels of scrutiny from the public and stakeholders (Brammer & Millington, 2006). Similarly, 
with high visibility the public and stakeholders have a higher level of scrutiny of the firm’s CSR 
activities. When the firm is not able to meet legitimacy expectations, e.g., when it experiences a 
socially irresponsible event, the firm is more likely to attract negative attention from the media and 
the public (Godfrey, 2005). 
Therefore the downside of not meeting stakeholder expectations increases with an increase in 
firm visibility, resulting in heightened legitimacy pressure regarding CSR practices. We expect that 
analysts would also place greater weight on CSR conformity of such firms. First, being widely 
known, highly visible firms are also likely to attract greater attention from analysts as compared to 
less-visible firms. Second, due to the severe negative financial consequences for highly visible firms 
often associated with nonconformity (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Wang & Qian, 2011), 
analysts’ assessment of the such firms is more likely to be influenced by conformity considerations. 
We thus postulate that:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Firm visibility moderates the relationship between CSR scope conformity 
and analyst coverage such that the postulated relationship is stronger among firms with greater 
visibility.
CSR Emphasis Differentiation and Analyst Recommendations
Although gaining legitimacy through conformity helps obtain analyst coverage, winning 
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favorable recommendations from analysts and other market actors requires firms to adopt distinct 
strategies that allow firms to be differentiated from their peers (Womack, 1996). Unlike material 
features that induce a prototypical categorization, abstract features with ambiguous information 
evoke audiences’ goal-based evaluation (Durand & Paolella, 2013). In the goal-based evaluation 
process audiences favor those practices that are unique or span existing fields because they are 
considered more capable of handling the case in point. Hence when being evaluated on the 
dimensions with abstract features, firms with a greater degree of differentiation are better able to 
signal their competence and value to audiences. In the case of CSR practices, while the overt 
structure (CSR scope) represents the material feature of the practice, the abstract feature is reflected 
in the emphasis dimension where audiences are likely to explore in greater depth how specific CSR 
activities can serve the firm’s strategic purposes, perhaps through enhancing firm relationships with 
salient stakeholders in their particular environments. In this process, firm efforts that are intended to 
align CSR activities with idiosyncratic firm features are preferred.
This argument is again consistent with some of the findings of the behavioral accounting studies 
on the decision-making process of security analysts. It is suggested that after the familiarizing phase 
during which all items on the checklist are examined, analysts then proceed to the next phase with 
the goal of looking for something extraordinary or unique. This is then integrated into the 
accumulated findings through the formulation of causal relations that explain variations in the key 
outcomes (Bouwman et al., 1987; Orlikowski, 2000). In line with our argument, previous research 
suggests that professional investors may prefer varied and idiosyncratic practices in very-specific 
fields to maximize judgment accuracy for the task at hand (Lys et al., 2015; Zhang & Galletta, 2006). 
This point can be illustrated with an example of Chinese firms’ environmental protection 
activities and how analysts evaluate them. In China environmental protection has not been a central 
focus for firms in the financial sector. However, in 2003 the International Finance Corporation and a 
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group of leading financial institutions proposed the Equator Principles, which provide a minimum 
standard of environmental and social risk management in project finance (Equator Principles, 2006). 
In 2008 the Industrial Bank of China became the first and only Chinese bank to adopt the Equator 
Principles. Compared to the conventional CSR issues addressed by other Chinese banks, the 
Industrial Bank’s unique CSR practice in a once-neglected CSR field was perceived as an important 
step forward in the industry, and commended by both executives and analysts in the banking sector 
(ChinaCSR, 2008). 
The above example underscores the point that firms are evaluated based more on the extent to 
which they effectively differentiate their efforts to satisfy the specific needs of their salient 
stakeholders and the manner in which these differentiated practices fit firms’ competitive positioning 
(Werbel & Wortman Jr, 2000). As one Chinese analyst remarked, “When integrating CSR factors 
into an investment analysis, the key is to focus on unique factors that are likely to have a material 
impact on the sustainability of a firm’s business model and its share price performance.” In contrast, 
the scope dimension is less consequential when conducting such analyses. Just like the composite 
index developed by third-party rating agencies, such indexes only provide a good and efficient first 
view of how comprehensively a firm has covered various aspects of a CSR rating scale, but may not 
adequately reflect the differences in the level of effort spent in satisfying the demand of salient 
stakeholders in the firm’s particular competitive context. 
In sum, the emphasis dimension of firms’ CSR practice provides crucial evidence for security 
analysts and the general market to arrive at their evaluations of a firm’s market value. We thus have: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The emphasis differentiation of CSR practices is positively associated with 
analysts’ investment recommendations and the firm’s market value. 
The benefits from emphasis differentiation in CSR may also vary across firms, depending on the 
extent that audiences appreciate firms’ differentiation efforts. In particular, we examine two factors 
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that are believed to affect analysts’ appreciation and/or capability in evaluating firm differentiation in 
CSR: high-status houses coverage, and the extent to which the firm faces earnings pressure.
Previous studies have suggested that brokerage houses can be divided into two hemispheres with 
high and low status. Compared to low-status houses, high-status ones often have more resources to 
enable their analysts to conduct independent research. Moreover, analysts serving in high-status 
houses often specialize in one or two industries and cover a limited number of firms, while low-
status houses usually serve more clients on a smaller scale and with higher turnover. Thus while 
analysts in low-status houses may spend more time conferring with clients and have little time to 
conduct research, analysts in high-status houses are often able to develop in-depth knowledge and 
expertise about the industry and the firms that they cover (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). This enhances 
the ability of analysts in high-status houses to understand firm differentiation efforts. 
In addition, high-status houses are less risk averse because they have established a reputation 
and strong legitimate base that buffers the potential negative consequences caused by their bold 
actions. In contrast, analysts in low-status houses are more likely to suffer reduced promotion 
opportunities or even job loss when they make bold forecasts that are not fulfilled. Thus analysts in 
low-status houses tend to take fewer risks in their forecasts by being more conservative and closer to 
the consensus forecast when evaluating more-innovative CSR activities. In comparison, analysts in 
high-status houses are more likely to dissent from the prevailing view and shift toward an alternative 
or emerging view without fearing the loss of status or being eliminated as players in the competition 
for business (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). For example, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2015) document that during the transition of the prevailing view from an agency logic to a 
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stakeholder logic, high-status brokerage houses were the first to shift their perception of CSR from a 
pessimistic view to a more-optimistic one, as indicated by their analysts’ more-positive 
recommendations of firms with better CSR performance. Similarly, we should also expect that 
compared to houses with lower status, high-status houses are likely to be more appreciative of firms’ 
efforts to strategically differentiate themselves in CSR.
We thus predict that when covered by analysts from high-status houses, firms’ efforts to 
differentiate their CSR practices are more likely to be recognized and appreciated, leading to better 
analyst recommendations and greater market value. 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): High-status houses coverage moderates the relationship between 
differentiation of CSR and analysts’ investment recommendations and the firm’s market value, 
such that for firms covered by higher-status houses the postulated relationship is stronger. 
While analysts have increasingly incorporated corporate social activities into their evaluations, 
as financial market intermediaries they still place strong emphasis on the financial prospects of the 
firms they cover. Indeed, the capacity of an organization to deliver a value proposition, i.e., its 
pragmatic legitimacy, serves as the basis of organizational legitimacy and has been shown to have 
the greatest impact on an organization’s success (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Ginzel, Kramer, & 
Sutton, 1992; Suchman, 1995). On the other hand, if a firm does not present itself as a viable profit-
making business then efforts to engage in unique or innovative CSR may be ineffective and 
stakeholders may perceive it negatively (Ginzel et al., 1992; Koh et al., 2014; Wang & Qian, 2011), 
leading to negative organizational outcomes. Thus under circumstances of adverse firm economic 
performance it is unlikely that analysts will still appreciate firms’ CSR differentiation efforts. 
Consequently, an effort to differentiate through manipulation of CSR emphasis may not result in 
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positive analyst recommendations or favorable market reaction, but may instead signal shirking in 
pragmatic exchanges (Suchman, 1995). 
Firm earnings are often considered the most important performance measure reported to 
outsiders, especially to analysts (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010). Meeting earnings benchmarks set by 
financial analysts helps to build credibility in the capital market and signal the firm’s profit-making 
capability, while failure to meet the earning expectations often results in negative analyst perceptions 
of the firm in terms of its economic viability. Analysts are consequently likely to question such a 
firm’s ability to use CSR to effectively differentiate itself from other firms and to gain competitive 
advantage (Kasznik & McNichols, 2002; Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008). We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Earning pressure moderates the relationship between differentiation of 
CSR, and analysts’ investment recommendations and the firm’s market value such that the 
postulated relationships are weaker among firms facing greater earning pressure. 
DATA AND METHOD
Data
The initial sample of this study is drawn from Chinese listed firms that reported CSR activities 
from 2008 to 2014. We used China’s public listed firms because of the reliability and consistency of 
their information compared to that collected through other sources, given the difficulty of data 
collection in emerging economies (Xu & Wang, 1999). The information on Chinese firms’ CSR is 
drawn from the China Listed Firm Corporate Social Responsibility Research Database maintained by 
the GTA Information Technology Co., Ltd. (www.gtarsc.com), a private firm that collects and 
categorizes CSR activities reported by listed firms starting in 2008. International scholars have 
widely used the data offered by GTA. For instance, Wang and Qian (2011) use this data to study 
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance; Sun, Hu, and Hillman (2016) discuss 
the dark side of board political capital; and Luo, Wang, and Zhang (2017) analyze institutional 
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complexity and firms’ CSR reporting. The GTA corporate social responsibility research database 
contains firms’ social activities in ten different CSR issue fields—shareholder protection, creditor 
protection, employee protection, supplier protection, customer protection, environment protection, 
public relations, CSR capacity building (system construction), work safety, and deficiency. Our 
analysis excludes the deficiency category because many reported activities in this field concern the 
overall deficiency of firms that is not directly related to social responsibility. The database collected 
information on specific social activities from each of these fields. The activity-level information 
includes project name, value, and unit. For instance, the real estate firm Vanke had twenty-seven 
activities in the environmental protection field in 2014, including the reduction of carbon emissions, 
waste sorting in communities, and electricity generated from renewable energy. 
The information on analyst coverage and recommendations is drawn from the China Listed Firm 
Financial Analyst Forecasting Research Database. Other information on basic firm-level 
characteristics is based primarily on the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database 
(Marquis & Qian, 2014). The final sample totaled 3,230 firm-years observations.
Dependent variables
Adjusted Analysts Coverage. Following previous studies (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; White, 2010), we considered an analyst to be covering a firm in year t if 
that analyst has issued an annual earnings forecast for that firm’s fiscal period ending in year t. We 
calculated Adjusted Analyst Coverage (White, 2010), which is the share of analysts covering an 
industry segment j that find it attractive to cover firm i. Formally, if there are Aj analysts covering 
industry segment j, and a count of these analysts, ai , chooses to cover firm i in that industry 
segment, then the adjusted coverage equals ai/Aj.
Analysts Recommendation. Consistent with past research (Luo et al., 2015; Watson, 2015), we 
used the mean investment recommendation for each firm i in year t as one of the dependent variables 
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of our study. The CSMAR database recorded analysts’ investment recommendations on a five-point 
scale, with one indicating a “strong buy” recommendation and five indicating a “sell” 
recommendation. The score was reversed when we constructed the variable so that higher 
recommendations took larger values. We assigned equal weight to each recommendation, and the 
dependent variable is the average of all the investment recommendations published by the analysts 
that followed the firm. 
Tobin’s Q. We used Tobin’s Q to measure each firm’s market value, which was calculated as the 
sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt over the book value of total assets 
(Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). Market value is usually based on expected cash flows and risks, 
which indicate future corporate performance.
Key Independent Variables: Conformity and Differentiation
Our independent variables were the degree of conformity and differentiation of firms’ CSR 
activities. We defined scope conformity as the extent of the focal firm’s CSR portfolio resembling 
the practices defined in the established guideline, and it mainly captures the variation along the scope 
dimension of a firm’s CSR practice. As discussed above, the CSR guideline has already established a 
standard CSR practice framework for all firms, which clearly identified important CSR issues. 
Therefore firms that followed the guideline and addressed more issues are considered to be showing 
higher conformity to the established norms. 
When comparing the scope conformity between firms that cover the same number (but not all) 
of CSR issue fields, it is important to consider the relative importance of the issue fields being 
covered. In fact, as previous studies have acknowledged, how to develop a weighting system for 
different CSR issue fields is an important methodological challenge that affects our capability to 
develop precise composite CSR measures (Watson, 2015). This study used the concept network 
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method to develop weights for each CSR field (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013). We first created a two-mode 
affiliation matrix for each year with nine CSR fields and the sample firms as the columns and rows 
respectively. The numbers in this affiliation matrix represent the number of projects or activities in a 
given CSR field reported by a given firm. To determine which CSR field is most essential to the 
firm’s CSR practice, we then transformed the two-mode affiliation networks (issue fields by firms) 
to one-mode concept networks (issue fields only) that show how different CSR fields co-occur and 
how strong the connections are among them. In such networks, activities that are more tightly 
connected with others can be viewed as the most essential CSR issue in an industry and at a 
particular time. To evaluate the importance of each issue field we calculated the eigenvector 
centrality values, which measure the network centrality of each issue field.
Based on these weights, we followed previous studies (Ansari et al., 2010; Fiss et al., 2012; 
Yuan et al., 2007) and operationalized CSR scope conformity as the sum of the products of dummies 
for each of the nine issue fields and the prior period’s eigenvector centrality scores for each issue 
field. A higher score indicates greater scope conformity. More formally, 
where CENit refers to the eigenvector centrality of issue field i at time t, and CSRit refers to whether 
issue field i was included in the firm’s report at time t (Yes = 1, No = 0). Thus the value of scope 
conformity is determined by both the number of issue fields addressed and the importance 
(eigenvector centrality) of these fields. A firm that addresses a large number of CSR fields but 
misses a field of higher importance may have a lower scope conformity score than one that addresses 
a lower number of fields with higher importance.
The second measure, emphasis differentiation, is defined as the extent to which a firm’s 
pattern of CSR emphasis deviates from the common patterns of other firms in the same industry. We 
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adopted a more-nuanced measure that quantifies the extent of efforts allocated to each issue field. It 
is a continuous measure calculated based on the percentage of firms’ efforts devoted to each CSR 
issue field rather than on a binary variable measuring whether or not a practice was adopted. In 
essence, our concept and measure of emphasis differentiation is closer to that of strategic deviation 
(Deephouse, 1999) and uniqueness (Litov et al., 2012) used in some other studies. Previous studies 
have argued that when comparing CSR practices it is important to normalize the measures by 
industry such that a firm is compared with the other firms in its own industry (Aguilera et al., 2006). 
Moreover, for complex and nascent practices like CSR, the content or the relative importance of its 
multiple constituents may change over time (Ansari et al., 2010). To capture these nuances, we 
calculated the difference between a firm’s emphasis and the industry average emphasis, and then 
weighted the absolute value of these differences using the eigenvector centrality of each field. The 
sum of the weighted differences across all nine CSR fields was used as an indicator of a firm’s CSR 
emphasis differentiation from the common practice. Lower scores indicate greater similarity to 
commonly adopted practices, whereas higher scores indicate greater differentiation of a firm’s CSR 
activities, making its CSR unique compared to others. More formally, 
𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 9∑
𝑖 = 1|𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 ― 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡|𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑖(𝑡 ― 1)
where AEit is the averaged emphasis in issue field i at time t, FEit is the firm’s emphasis in issue field 
i at time t, and CENit is the eigenvector centrality of issue field i at time t. Both conformity and 
differentiation measures are continuous variables. Standardized scores are used in subsequent 
analyses. 
Other Independent Variables
We constructed a dummy variable indicating a firm’s ownership type based on the status of the 
firm’s ultimate controllers. Firms that are controlled by state asset management agencies or other 
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government agencies are regarded as state-owned enterprises (SOE), otherwise they are regarded as 
nonstate owned. 
Firm visibility was operationalized by a firm’s advertising intensity. This variable was calculated 
as the ratio of selling and administrative expenses to sales (Wang & Qian, 2011). It captures a firm’s 
willingness to spend on marketing and selling-related activities in an effort to differentiate itself from 
competitors.
High-status houses coverage is measured by the ratio of star houses to the total number of 
brokerage houses that cover a firm. Beginning in 2003, Chinese analysts, often working in teams for 
a brokerage house, have been ranked annually according to their performance by New Fortune 
magazine. Highly ranked analyst teams are included in the New Fortune Best Analyst list 
(http://www.xcf.cn). If a brokerage house has analyst teams on the New Fortune Best Analyst list we 
coded the brokerage house as a star house. 
Earnings pressure is used to account for the extent to which firm performance meets analysts’ 
expectations. This variable is measured as the difference between analysts’ consensus forecasts of a 
firm’s earnings in year t and the firm’s actual earnings for year t (Gentry & Shen, 2013; Washburn & 
Bromiley, 2014). 
Control Variables
We controlled the factors that were suggested in previous studies to influence our dependent 
variables. We included a few variables to control the characteristics of CEOs and corporate 
governance, which tend to influence analysts’ coverage and recommendations as well as firm value 
(Jiraporn, Liu, & Kim, 2014; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). CEO power is a composite index (Briscoe, 
Chin, & Hambrick, 2014) calculated as Cronbach’s alpha value of (1) CEO duality, that is, whether 
the CEO also serves as the chair of the board of directors, (2) whether the CEO was the founder of 
the firm, and (3) the equity share held by the CEO. The reliability score is 0.67. CEO MBA is a 
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dummy variable indicating whether a CEO holds an MBA degree (Yes = 1, No = 0). 
Two additional CEO-related variables are specific to the context of China: CEO returnee and 
CEO party member. CEO returnee is a dummy variable indicating whether a CEO had overseas 
work or education experience (Yes = 1, No = 0). CEO party member indicates whether the CEO is a 
member of the Communist Party (Yes = 1, No = 0). Moreover, the percentage of independent 
directors was included to measure the strength of the internal monitoring for effective corporate 
governance (Harjoto & Jo, 2011). TMT equity holding, operationalized as the percentage of firm 
equity held by a firm’s top management team, was used to measure managerial incentives. We 
included a dummy variable (Yes = 1, No = 0) to indicate firms’ membership in socially contested 
industries, such as alcoholic beverages, defense, and tobacco manufacturing (Kim & Skinner, 2012; 
Koh et al., 2014). We controlled for the influence of ownership concentration, calculated as the total 
equity shares held by the five largest shareholders, on the market value of firms (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, 
& Zhang, 2004).
We also controlled for several typical firm-level variables. List age refers to the number of years 
that the firm was listed on China’s stock exchanges as of 2014. Firm size is measured by the number 
of firm employees. We used its natural logarithm to correct its skewed distribution. Return on asset 
is an accounting measure of firm profitability, which calculates management’s efficiency in using its 
assets to generate earnings. Financial leverage (i.e., the ratio of total debt to equity) serves as a 
proxy for capital structure, which is significantly correlated with firm performance (Mishra & Modi, 
2013). The overall level of CSR measures a firm’s total number of CSR activities in each year. Share 
price is measured by the median of the monthly average of open price and close price in a single 
year. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, we winsorized all variables generated from 
the accounting data at the 2.5 percentile in each tail (our results are also robust at other cutoff points, 
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e.g., 0.5 percent or 1 percent in each tail). We also lagged these variables by one year. Table 1 
summarizes the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics.
******Insert Table 1 About Here******
Methods 
Taking advantage of our panel dataset, we used firm fixed-effects models to control for all time-
invariant differences across firms. To determine whether the fixed-effects model was appropriate for 
this study, we additionally conducted a Hausman test in which the null hypothesis is that the unique 
errors are not correlated with the regressors. The test result rejects the null hypothesis, thereby 
supporting our choice of fixed-effects models. In addition to the firm fixed-effects models, we used 
three additional estimation methods to check the robustness of our empirical findings, namely the 
instrumental variable approach, first-difference regression, and dose-response functions. Details of 
these tests are described in the Robustness Tests section. 
RESULTS
Our first analysis explored the effect of scope conformity on the adjusted analysts’ coverage. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the scope conformity of firms’ CSR practices is positively associated with 
adjusted analysts’ coverage. The results are reported in Table 2, in which Model 1 used adjusted 
analyst coverage as the outcome variable. Model 1 incorporated scope conformity and other control 
variables. The coefficient of the scope conformity is positive and statistically significant 
( = 0.073, p < 0.001), which is consistent with our prediction. Models 2 and 3 [M1]𝛽𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦
test Hypothesis 3, which states that the emphasis differentiation of firms’ CSR practices is positively 
associated with analysts’ recommendation and firms’ market value. We incorporated emphasis 
differentiation and control variables in both models. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients ( = 0.036, p < 0.01; = 0.172, p < [M2]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 [M3]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0.001) supported our H3. 
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******Insert Table 2 About Here******
Our second analysis explored the alignment between firms’ CSR strategies and macro as well as 
firm-level characteristics. Hypotheses 2a and 2b postulate that state ownership and firms’ visibility 
moderate the relationship between CSR scope conformity and adjusted analyst coverage, such that 
the relationships are stronger among state firms or firms with higher visibility. Models 4 and 5 
(Table 3) included both the explanatory variables and their interaction terms with the moderators. 
The interaction term between scope conformity and SOE is positive and significant 
( = 0.021, p < 0.01), indicating that the positive relationship between scope [M4]𝛽𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸
conformity and adjusted analyst coverage is stronger among SOEs than it is among non-SOEs. This 
supports our H2a. The interaction term between scope conformity and firms’ visibility in Model 5 is 
also positive and statistically significant ( = 0.060, p < 0.05), [M5]𝛽𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
suggesting that the positive relationship between scope conformity and adjusted analyst coverage is 
stronger for firms with higher visibility. Our H2b is thus supported. 
Models 6 and 8 test our Hypothesis 4a, which suggests that the relationship between emphasis 
differentiation and analyst recommendation and firms’ market value is moderated by the 
characteristics of the key referent audience. The interaction term between emphasis differentiation 
and high-status houses coverage in Model 6 is positive and significant 
( = 0.067, p < 0.1), indicating that the emphasis [M6]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ― 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
differentiation of firms’ CSR practice brings relatively more beneficial impact on analyst 
recommendation if firms are covered by more star brokerage houses. Similarly, when we changed 
the outcome variable to firms’ Tobin’s Q in Model 8, the interaction term was also positive and 
significant ( = 0.135, p < 0.05), indicating that [M8]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ― 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
a firm covered by more high-status brokerage houses will benefit more from its emphasis 
differentiation of CSR practice as compared to those covered by fewer high-status brokerage houses. 
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These results lend support to our H4a. 
Our Hypothesis 4b states that the relationship between the emphasis differentiation, and analyst 
recommendation and firms’ market value is moderated by the earnings pressure that firms face. The 
interaction term between emphasis differentiation and earnings pressure in Model 7 is negative and 
significant ( = -0.062, p < 0.05), indicating that the [M7]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
emphasis differentiation of firms’ CSR practice will bring relatively less-beneficial impact on analyst 
recommendation when firms face greater earnings pressure. When we changed the outcome variable 
to firms’ Tobin’s Q in Model 9, the interaction term was negative and significant 
( = -0.146, p < 0.001), indicating that the positive impact [M9]𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
of firms’ emphasis differentiation brings less-beneficial impact on firms’ market value for those 
facing greater earnings pressure than those with better financial performance. These results lend 
support to our H4b.
******Insert Table 3 About Here******
Robustness Tests
We employed several model specifications as alternatives to the fixed-effects models to test the 
robustness of our main results: the instrumental variable approach, first-difference regressions, and 
the dose-response function. We first adopted the instrumental variable approach to address 
endogeneity concerns. The ideal instrumental variable should have an influence on CSR scope 
conformity and CSR emphasis differentiation but be exogenous to the adjusted analysts’ coverage, 
recommendation, or market value. Using this principle, we included an instrumental variable, i.e., the 
number of social organizations in Chinese provinces normalized by regional GDP. The data were 
drawn from the China Statistical Yearbook, which has information about various types of social 
organizations including charity organizations, environmental protection organizations, and other 
types of NGOs or voluntary organizations. Previous literature suggests social organizations’ activism 
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exerts a strong impact on CSR activities (Cantor & Packer, 1997), and we thus argue that regions 
with more social organizations tend to represent a wide variety of stakeholder interests and thus may 
press firms to address a wide range of issues. This may positively affect CSR scope conformity. 
Moreover, heterogeneous social organizations may provide diverse collaborative opportunities for 
firms to differentiate their CSR practices to address their unique challenges, and are thus positively 
associated with firms’ emphasis differentiation. However, the number of social organizations in a 
province is less likely to have an impact on analyst coverage, recommendation decisions, or firms’ 
market value. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the first-stage regression results, with scope conformity and 
emphasis differentiation as the dependent variables. The main variables of interest are the 
coefficients on the instrumental variable—number of social organizations in a region, which is 
positive and significant. Columns 3 to 5 report the results from the second-stage regressions with the 
main variable of interest replaced by the fitted values of scope conformity and emphasis 
differentiation from the first-stage regressions. The coefficient estimates of these models are again 
highly consistent with the baseline results.
We also used the first-difference regressions (see Table 5) to examine whether year-to-year 
changes in the degree of scope conformity are associated with corresponding changes in the level of 
adjusted analyst coverage. Compared to the fixed-effects models, the first-difference models were 
more efficient and robust when serial correlations are present. We regressed the dependent variables 
on the same independent and control variables in the first-difference format, including year and firm 
fixed-effects (White, 2010). The t-statistics are based on cluster-adjusted standard errors at the firm 
level. The results indicate that the year-to-year increases in scope conformity are associated with 
higher adjusted analyst coverage. Moreover, conditional on adjusted analyst coverage, the year-to-
year increase in emphasis differentiation enhances the analyst recommendations that firms received, 
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as well as the firms’ Tobin’s Q. These results are highly consistent with our main findings. 
******Insert Tables 4, 5, & 6 About Here******
The third specification employed a newly developed method called the dose-response 
function (DRF), which helps estimate the causal effects of CSR practices on analyst and market 
reactions. The approach is in line with the more commonly used matching methods but with a major 
difference: while the matching methods deal with selection issues associated with binary treatments, 
in many observational studies the treatment may not be binary or even categorical. In such a case, 
one may be interested in estimating the DRF where the treatment might take on continuous values. A 
similar method has been used in related fields. For instance, Fryges (2009) employs the DRF method 
to estimate the relationship between individual firms’ export behavior and firm performance. Instead 
of distinguishing firms’ export status as exporting and nonexporting, the study introduces continuous 
treatment and estimates the impact of different levels of firms’ export activities. Moreover, in the 
accounting field Core (2010) uses a similar method to study whether CEO equity incentives cause 
accounting irregularities. 
This method is also applicable to the context of this paper since firms’ CSR scope conformity 
and emphasis differentiation are not binary treatment variables. DRF is generally used together with 
the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology. It is important to note that the observational 
data we used are different from experimental data because the selection in the treatment versus 
nontreatment group is not randomized, which may undermine our causal inference. The 
implementation of the GPS method consists of three steps (Bia & Mattei, 2008). In the first step we 
estimated the conditional distribution of the treatment given the covariates. In the second step we 
estimated the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of two scalar variables, the 
treatment level and the GPS. In the third step we used a DRF to estimate the average treatment 
effects (ATE) of the treatment variables, which helps us understand how the degree of scope 
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conformity and emphasis differentiation affect the amount of outcomes. We used Stata gpscore 
procedure to estimate the model (Bia & Mattei, 2008). Results from the DRF model (see Table 6) 
show that the effect of scope conformity on adjusted analyst coverage, and the effects of emphasis 
differentiation on analyst recommendation and Tobin’s Q are positive and significant, which lend 
support to our causal inference. While the GPS-based DRF approach uses observable measures to 
construct a weight based on selection, the IV method relies on an instrumental variable created from 
unmeasured or unobserved factors. Thus an advantage of the IV method is that it accounts for 
unmeasured factors correlated with the outcome. This is especially helpful in analyzing datasets that 
were not created for the purpose of a particular research question.
In regard to the operationalization of the emphasis dimension, we used the multidimensional 
scaling method, a dimension-reduction and visualization technique, to construct an alternative 
measure (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013). Dissimilarities (for instance, Euclidean distances) among 
observations in a high-dimensional space are represented in a lower-dimensional space (typically two 
dimensions) so that the Euclidean distance in the lower-dimensional space approximates the 
dissimilarities in the higher-dimensional space. The Euclidean distance from the centroid is used as 
an indicator of emphasis differentiation. The results obtained using this measure are substantively 
similar to those using the above indicator.
In addition, we estimated the relative influence of both independent variables on the outcome 
variables. The results are reported in Table 7. Model 1 of Table 7 shows the effects of both 
independent variables on adjusted analyst coverage. The coefficient of scope conformity is positive 
and significant, while the coefficient of emphasis is not statistically significant. Similarly, Model 2 
shows that scope conformity has no significant impact on analyst recommendations while emphasis 
differentiation is significantly and positively related to analyst recommendations. Model 3 shows that 
emphasis differentiation again has a significant impact on Tobin’s Q, while the scope conformity’s 
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coefficient is negative and only marginally significant at the 0.1 level. These results are in line with 
our arguments for the dominance of conformity in scope and differentiation in emphasis.
******Insert Table 7 About Here******
DISCUSSION
The complexity of CSR presents new challenges for businesses regarding how to effectively 
engage in social practices. Building on and extending the optimal distinctiveness perspective, we 
argue that firms may be able to simultaneously conform in CSR scope and differentiate in CSR 
emphasis to achieve optimal distinctiveness. We evaluated the effectiveness of firms’ CSR practices 
through exploring how firms’ conformity and differentiation efforts can affect the way their CSR 
practices are assessed or interpreted by key constituents, such as security analysts and other market 
actors (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Watson, 2015). We demonstrated that as CSR becomes an 
institutionalized practice among Chinese firms, conforming to basic principles of CSR in terms of 
scope makes firms appear legitimate in the analyst community, and the efforts in differentiating a 
CSR portfolio in the emphasis dimension lead to more-favorable analyst recommendations and 
higher market value. Furthermore, to enhance our understanding of the variation in the relationship 
between conformity/differentiation and the response of analysts and the market, we investigated how 
this relationship is conditioned by some firm- and analyst-level factors.
Our study contributes to the emerging optimal distinctiveness literature by theoretically 
articulating and empirically testing the orchestration mechanisms that firms adopt within a single 
complex practice, and examining the way that such orchestration helps firms gain recognition and 
favorable evaluation by sophisticated audiences. In particular, what we examine is a form of 
compensatory orchestration, reflecting the idea that deviation in one strategic dimension can be 
compensated by legitimacy in a different strategic dimension. The current understanding of 
compensatory orchestration, summarized by Zhao et al. (2017), rests on the availability of multiple 
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strategies in the market space and features of organizational environments that are multiple, 
fragmented, and dynamic. This study shifts the research focus from multiple strategies and 
dynamisms in the environment to complexity in the practice itself. By doing so, our study points to 
the possibility of simultaneously achieving conformity and differentiation in one specific practice or 
strategy dimension. 
In the context of analysts’ evaluations of firms’ CSR practices, our findings suggest that firms 
can strategically configure their responses across different dimensions of CSR practices to secure 
analysts’ preferences and enhanced performance evaluations. Specifically, firms are positively 
received by analysts when firms make efforts to cover more important CSR fields that are congruent 
with normative and regulative expectations, and when the deployment of attention across different 
CSR fields reflects the idiosyncratic needs or positioning of these firms. Through such compensatory 
orchestration idiosyncratic differentiation decisions are coupled with supportive and congruent 
actions that help firms overcome the liability of distinctiveness. In other words, the seemingly 
contradicting operation, i.e., conformity vs. differentiation, can be mutually reinforcing, which 
jointly helps firms to gain basic legitimacy and to stake out a competitive position.
Another key contribution of this study is that it contextualizes optimal distinctiveness 
discussions and enhances our understanding of the conditions under which orchestration along 
different dimensions of firms’ social responsibility practices leads to differential impacts on firms’ 
performance and their perceived value among key audiences. We argue that the extent of conformity 
pressure varies across firms. In our case, state ownership and firms’ visibility lead to variations in 
firms’ legitimacy pressure, which in turn conditions the effectiveness of firms’ conforming actions. 
Our results indicate that firms that depend on the state for critical resources and legitimacy may feel 
a greater imperative to conform to regulatory pressure; similarly, firms that attract more market 
attention are expected to conform to the expectations of the general public. Thus firm decisions on 
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CSR conformity need to take the influences of various stakeholders into account. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of emphasis differentiation in CSR practices largely varies 
with the extent to which audiences appreciate the firm’s differentiation efforts. Previous studies 
postulate that different stakeholders often have heterogeneous expectations because they may have 
been socialized to value or ignore certain dimensions of a practice during evaluation processes 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Zhao et al., 2017). Our study further argues that even in the same 
stakeholder/audience group the status heterogeneity of group members can lead to variations in their 
preferences or expectations. We found evidence suggesting that the higher reputation and stronger 
legitimacy base enjoyed by high-status brokerage houses allow analysts associated with such houses 
to show greater flexibility and make bolder forecasts when facing ambiguous classifications and 
innovative offerings. Our study also highlights the fact that the extent to which audiences appreciate 
a firm’s differentiation effort can be affected by whether the firm has gained fundamental, pragmatic 
legitimacy in terms of financial performance. Our findings indicate that market valuations of unique 
CSR practices are discounted if firms experience legitimacy challenges in terms of poor financial 
performance (as reflected in high earnings pressure). 
Moreover, our key arguments for scope conformity and emphasis differentiation can be 
potentially generalized to CSR strategies in a broad range of contexts or to the analyses of the 
adoptions of other management innovations. The particular context in which our study’s empirical 
analysis is situated, i.e., CSR practices among Chinese firms, provides a good opportunity to 
examine a salient contrast between scope conformity and emphasis differentiation, and the 
effectiveness of a firm’s orchestration efforts and its contingencies in a dynamic context with 
emerging market categories. As national governments play an increasingly important role in 
promoting CSR practices in many countries, including those in Europe, North America, and Africa, 
the pressure from regulatory institutions becomes increasingly potent in shaping firms’ CSR strategy 
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(European Commission, 2014). While the Chinese context has some distinctive features, we expect 
that our key arguments can also help us understand firms’ CSR strategies in other economies. That 
said, nuanced variations may still occur due to differences in specific organizational environments 
where even with complex practices the dominance of conformity in scope (vs. conformity in 
emphasis) and differentiation in emphasis (vs. differentiation in scope) may not always be as 
obvious. 
Our analytical framework can also be applied to investigating the impacts of firms’ adoption of 
other management practices that are complex and multidimensional. For instance, previous studies 
have examined the adoption of total quality management (TQM) practices (Douglas & Judge, 2001; 
Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). However, much research only focuses on the adoption of 
different core elements supporting the TQM philosophy and tries to understand how this degree of 
adoption affects firms’ performance (Douglas & Judge, 2001). Similar to CSR, TQM practice also 
has multiple elements with specific operational items within each element. Thus our framework 
would allow researchers to parse firms’ adoption of TQM along the scope and emphasis dimensions 
and accordingly examine their implications for achieving legitimacy and performance advantages. In 
addition to TQM, the voluntary adoption of diversity programs, i.e., practices that assess and develop 
the diversity of the workforce and its equal treatment, could be another instance. As such practices 
gradually disperse from the United States to Europe and other nations, firms face increasing social 
pressure to address various forms of workplace discrimination (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005). 
Diversity policies often encompass a wide range of individual differences, not just gender and race 
but other visible or less-visible differences that could lead to discrimination in the workplace. Firms 
may comply with the all-encompassing initiatives, or address some particular subjects that are 
pertinent to their industry or sociocultural environment (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006), or 
simultaneously achieve both. Again, our framework would help better capture these nuanced 
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variations and their implications for various management and even financial outcomes. 
Methodologically, we experimented with a new method to quantify the relative importance of 
different CSR issue fields. Previous studies have acknowledged that an important methodological 
difficulty faced by scholars is how to develop a weighting system for different CSR subjects. This 
issue affected our capability to develop precise composite CSR measures (Watson, 2015). Different 
from studies that rely on either subjective academic opinions about category importance or the 
assignment of equal importance to issue areas, our study borrows insights from concept network 
analysis and views the different issue areas as an interconnected system that reflects the pattern of 
association of these abstract concepts for specific actors (Fiss et al., 2012). The aggregation of these 
individual networks generates structural patterns that help us better understand how practices are put 
together, and to quantitatively grasp the temporal and sectoral variations of complex CSR practices. 
In addition to contributions to the academic literature, our findings also have practical 
implications for corporate executives who are responsible for designing firms’ social programs. Our 
results indicate that investment communities not only care about the financial metrics of 
organizations but also consider nonfinancial metrics such as environmental and social issues. With a 
greater number of investors incorporating firms’ social performance in their investment decisions, it 
is time for corporate leaders to reexamine their strategies in coping with pressures during the 
institutionalization of CSR. However, when considering their strategic options many managers still 
focus on rankings in various sustainability or corporate philanthropy indices, and try to achieve a 
higher ranking by investing much time and effort in tailoring their social program according to the 
reporting frameworks specified by the rating agencies (Aguilera et al., 2006). Although such 
practices may help firms obtain basic legitimacy from the investment community, they fall short in 
convincing the audience that firms’ social practices are well aligned with firms’ competitive 
positioning and the industrial or market contexts in which they operate. Executives are thus advised 
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to fully appreciate the complexity of CSR practices and to more effectively orchestrate their efforts 
in the overt versus substantive dimensions of the practice. 
When interpreting the current findings, it is important to consider the limitations associated with 
this study. First, ideally the level of CSR differentiation should incorporate not only the number of 
social activities in different fields but also the uniqueness in each activity. However, our data is 
limited in that it only contains the number of activities in each field but not specific information for 
each activity. This limitation is also observed in the previous studies we cite such as Litov et al. 
(2012) and Deephouse (1999), both of which do not directly measure uniqueness in specific strategic 
action but proxy it by looking at deviation of effort allocation from the norm in terms of sales and 
assets respectively. Future studies are encouraged to develop more-comprehensive measures that can 
fully appreciate the qualitative differences of specific activities in each CSR field. 
Second, as CSR becomes an increasingly important issue in today’s business world, it may 
require a learning process in both the firm’s and analysts’ perspectives. It is possible that firms gain 
experience over time in balancing and orchestrating between conformity and differentiation. 
Similarly, it may take time for security analysts to explore methods that more effectively incorporate 
CSR information into their valuation model. In a supplementary analysis we incorporate time at a 
moderator and do find some scant evidence for a learning process. However, limited by the data 
availability and the theoretical scope of the current study, we are not able to fully explore this issue 
here. Future studies could thus examine whether the impact of CSR conformity and differentiation is 
potentiated as firms and the financial analysts learn about CSR practices over time.
CONCLUSION
This paper borrows insights from the optimal distinctiveness literature and advances this line of 
inquiry by investigating the way that firms orchestrate different dimensions of CSR practices to 
simultaneously cope with conformity pressure and seek differentiation advantages. We find that 
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conformity along the more-salient CSR scope dimension helps firms gain legitimacy and thus leads 
to more analyst coverage, while the differentiation efforts along the more-substantive emphasis 
dimension create strategic value for firms and lead to more favorable evaluations by analysts and 
higher market value. Moreover, we find that the effectiveness of these orchestration efforts is also 
influenced by firm- and analyst-level factors. Because firm stakeholders, the general public, and 
many national governments increasingly view CSR as an essential component of corporate activities, 
our study provides a new perspective for understanding how firms cope with such complex forces to 
get ahead in the new environment. 
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlations
Note: Correlations ≥ |0.08| are significant at p < 0.001; correlations ≥ |0.05| are significant at p < 0.01; correlations ≥ |0.04| are significant at p < 0.05. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 Adjusted analyst coverage 1.00
2 Analyst recommendation 0.24 1.00
3 Tobin’s Q 0.15 0.08 1.00
4 Scope conformity 0.02 -0.01 -0.30 1.00
5 Emphasis differentiation -0.01 0.14 0.13 -0.08 1.00
6 State-owned enterprises 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.20 -0.01 1.00
7 Earnings pressure -0.09 -0.25 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
8 TMT equity holding -0.01 0.09 0.21 0.13 -0.01 -0.29 -0.03 1.00
9 Socially contested industries -0.07 0.03 0.20 0.18 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.03 1.00
10 CEO power 0.00 0.09 0.25 0.07 -0.04 -0.23 -0.03 0.41 0.12 1.00
11 CEO returnee 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.09 1.00
12 CEO party member 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 0.02 0.01 1.00
13 CEO MBA degree 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.04 1.00
14 Pct. Independent directors 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.03 1.00
15 Ownership concentration 0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 1.00
16 Financial leverage 0.01 -0.06 -0.50 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.26 -0.20 -0.21 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.01 1.00
17 Visibility 0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 1.00
18 List age -0.01 0.01 -0.25 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.41 0.07 -0.28 -0.08 0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.31 0.14 -0.11 1.00
19 Firm size 0.30 0.11 -0.34 0.09 0.11 0.06 -0.10 -0.24 0.01 -0.17 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.35 -0.07 0.08 1.00
20 Firm ROA 0.27 0.27 0.44 -0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.50 0.05 0.15 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.44 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 1.00
21 Share price 0.28 0.20 0.60 -0.20 0.08 0.04 -0.49 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.20 0.11 0.46 -0.08 -0.23 1.00
22 Overall level of CSR 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.06 -0.16 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.12 -0.10 -0.04 0.36 0.12 -0.09 1.00
23 High-status houses coverage 0.11 0.17 0.01 -0.10 0.17 -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.09 1.00
24 Social organization 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.10 -0.04 -0.16 1.00
Mean 0.40 4.08 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.28 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.18 0.39 0.12 0.37 0.55 0.47 0.15 0.07 8.28 10.74 14.62 23.10 0.54 0.86
S.D. 0.33 0.55 1.38 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.45 0.12 0.21 0.80 0.38 0.49 0.32 0.06 0.17 0.27 0.13 0.08 1.51 5.74 12.19 45.94 0.27 0.36
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Table 2: Impacts of firms’ CSR strategy on analyst coverage, analyst recommendation, and Tobin’s Q
M1: Adjusted Analyst Coverage　 M2: Analyst Recommendation　 M3: Tobin’s Q　
　
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Scope conformity 0.073 0.006 *** -- -- 　 -- -- 　
Emphasis differentiation -- -- 0.036 0.012 ** 0.172 0.018 ***
Adjusted Analyst Coverage -- -- 0.249 0.047 *** 0.113 0.023 ***
SOE -0.008 0.012 0.016 0.029 -0.281 0.049 ***
Earnings pressure -0.048 0.012 *** -0.159 0.028 *** -0.252 0.047 ***
TMT equity holding -0.023 0.093 0.059 0.220 -0.469 0.373
Socially contested industries -0.039 0.044 -0.180 0.099 † -1.082 0.152 ***
CEO power 0.003 0.011 0.060 0.027 * 0.059 0.046
CEO returnee -0.005 0.017 0.022 0.041 -0.083 0.071
CEO party member 0.027 0.024 -0.059 0.033 † -0.073 0.056
CEO MBA degree -0.032 0.021 0.011 0.049 0.029 0.084
Pct. independent directors 0.262 0.125 * 0.214 0.293 0.173 0.498
Ownership concentration -0.294 0.267 -0.206 0.190 0.131 0.325
Financial leverage 0.078 0.132 0.062 0.094 -0.372 0.161 *
Visibility -0.304 0.353 -0.238 0.258 0.263 0.428
List age -0.057 0.011 *** 0.040 0.006 *** -0.198 0.011 ***
Firm size 0.111 0.033 *** 0.042 0.023 † -0.155 0.040 ***
Firm ROA 2.563 0.308 *** 0.953 0.221 *** 3.364 0.379 ***
Share price 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 *** 0.036 0.002 ***
Overall level of CSR 0.002 0.001 * -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 *
High-status houses coverage 0.096 0.041 * 0.249 0.062 ***
Constant 2.71 0.555 *** 2.528 0.388 *** 6.407 0.663 ***
No. of Observations 3230 3203 3224
Adjusted R-Square 0.67 　 　 0.45 　 　 0.79 　 　
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1 
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Table 3: Impacts of firms’ CSR strategy on analyst coverage, analyst recommendation, and Tobin’s Q
M4: Adjusted 
Analyst Coverage　
M5: Adjusted 
Analyst Coverage
M6: Analyst 
Recommendation
M7: Analyst 
Recommendation M8: Tobin’s Q M9: Tobin’s Q　
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 　 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Scope conformity 0.059 0.00 *** 0.018 0.005 *** -- -- 　 -- -- 　 -- -- 　 -- -- 　
Emphasis differentiation -- -- -- -- 0.034 0.020 † 0.080 0.014 *** 0.168 0.032 *** 0.314 0.023 ***
Scope conformity × SOE 0.021 0.007 ** -- -- -- -- 　 -- -- -- -- -- --
Scope conformity × Visibility -- -- 0.060 0.029 * -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Emphasis differentiation  × 
high-status houses coverage -- -- -- -- 0.067 0.039 † -- -- 0.135 0.064 * -- --
Emphasis differentiation  × 
Earnings pressure -- -- -- -- -- -- 　 -0.062 0.026 * -- -- -0.146 0.045 ***
Adjusted analyst coverage -- -- -- -- 0.123 0.014 *** 0.249 0.047 *** 0.041 0.022 † 0.112 0.072
SOE -0.011 0.010 0.010 0.041 0.030 0.029 0.019 0.029 0.045 0.042 -0.271 0.049 ***
Earnings pressure -0.164 0.039 *** -0.299 0.034 *** -0.160 0.028 *** -0.160 0.028 *** -0.101 0.046 * -0.260 0.047 ***
TMT equity holding 0.011 0.307 -0.042 0.309 0.064 0.220 　 0.093 0.220 -0.426 0.354 -0.401 0.373
Socially contested industries 0.113 0.072 0.148 0.070 -0.141 0.101 　 -0.116 0.050 * -1.292 0.163 *** -1.057 0.385 ***
CEO power 0.012 0.038 0.009 0.037 0.056 0.027 * 0.060 0.027 * -0.004 0.044 0.062 0.046
CEO returnee -0.048 0.058 -0.050 0.056 0.030 0.041 　 0.022 0.041 -0.049 0.067 -0.082 0.070
CEO party member 0.018 0.046 0.017 0.043 -0.067 0.033 * -0.054 0.033 † -0.083 0.053 -0.067 0.055
CEO MBA degree -0.115 0.069 † -0.092 0.067 † 0.015 0.049 　 0.011 0.049 -0.021 0.080 0.027 0.084
Pct. independent directors -0.422 0.410 -0.310 0.390 0.212 0.292 　 0.270 0.293 -0.043 0.471 0.296 0.499
Ownership concentration -0.329 0.267 -0.234 0.254 -0.180 0.190 -0.227 0.193 0.772 0.299 ** 0.173 0.324
Financial leverage -0.373 0.132 ** -0.105 0.116 ** 0.057 0.094 　 0.058 0.094 -0.442 0.153 ** -0.390 0.161 *
Visibility -0.267 0.354 -0.596 0.331 -0.246 0.258 　 -0.250 0.258 0.121 0.405 0.234 0.427
List age -0.056 0.011 *** -0.057 0.011 *** 0.041 0.007 *** 0.043 0.007 *** -0.021 0.010 * -0.092 0.011 ***
Firm size 0.112 0.033 *** 0.110 0.033 *** 0.041 0.024 † 0.042 0.023 † -0.278 0.036 *** -0.153 0.040 ***
Firm ROA 2.577 0.309 *** 2.552 0.310 *** 0.916 0.221 *** 0.947 0.222 *** 2.265 0.364 *** 3.325 0.378 ***
Share price 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 *** 0.004 0.001 *** 0.047 0.002 *** 0.036 0.002 ***
Overall level of CSR 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 * -0.005 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 ***
High-status houses coverage 0.097 0.041 * 0.099 0.041 * 0.131 0.066 * 0.248 0.062 ***
Constant 2.778 0.556 *** 2.718 0.555 *** 2.447 0.390 *** 2.460 0.389 *** 4.434 0.635 *** 6.216 0.665 ***
No. of Observations 3230 3230 3203 　 3203 3224 3224
Adjusted R-Square 0.74 　 　 0.73 　 　 0.37 　 　 0.38 　 　 0.79 　 　 0.79 　 　
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. 
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Table 4: Two-stage least squares regressions with the instruments of regional social organizations
First stage regression Second stage regression
(1)
Scope 
conformity
(2)
Emphasis 
differentiation
(3)
Adjusted analyst 
coverage
(4)
Analyst 
recommendation
(5)
Tobin's Q
Social organizations 0.122* 0.972*** -- -- --
(0.051) (0.148)
Scope conformity -- -- 1.289 ** -- --
(Instrumented) (0.499)
Emphasis differentiation -- -- -- 0.266*** 1.021***
(Instrumented) (0.047) (0.232)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2725 2725 2719 2719 2719
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 5: First differences regressions predicting the effects of CSR strategies
Δ Adjusted analyst 
coverage
Δ Analyst 
recommendation Δ Tobin’s Q
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Δ Scope conformity 0.073 0.009 *** -- -- -- --
Δ Emphasis differentiation -- -- 0.036 0.013 ** 0.283 0.019 ***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 2057 2037 2050
R-squared 0.38 0.25 0.38
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. All models include year and firm fixed effects, and control 
variables as in Table 3 (which are not shown for brevity). 
Table 6: Dose-response models predicting the average treatment effects of CSR strategies
Adjusted analyst 
Coverage
Analyst 
recommendation Tobin’s Q
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Continuous treatment variable
Scope conformity 0.886 0.111 *** -- -- -- --
Emphasis differentiation -- -- 0.061 0.029 * 0.565 0.079 ***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 3230 3203 3224
R-squared 0.39 0.13 0.60
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. All models include year and firm fixed effects, and control 
variables as in Table 3 (which are not shown for brevity). 
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Table 7: Models estimating the effects of scope conformity and emphasis differentiation on analyst 
coverage, recommendation, and Tobin’s Q
M1:
Adjusted
Analyst Coverage
M2:
Analyst 
Recommendation
M3:
Tobin’s Q
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Scope conformity 0.035 0.015 * -0.021 0.036 　 -0.113 0.060 †
Emphasis differentiation 0.021 0.014 0.071 0.033 * 0.484 0.054 ***
Adjusted Analyst Coverage -- -- 0.142 0.019 *** 0.164 0.030 ***
SOE -0.012 0.017 0.006 0.035 -0.138 0.065 *
Earnings pressure -0.049 0.014 *** -0.139 0.034 *** -0.056 0.054
TMT equity holding 0.085 0.109 -0.221 0.267 -0.524 0.415
Socially contested industries -0.011 0.069 -0.227 0.167 -0.974 0.263 ***
CEO power -0.007 0.012 0.065 0.031 * 0.015 0.049
CEO returnee -0.020 0.025 0.025 0.060 0.028 0.095
CEO party member 0.011 0.018 -0.073 0.044 † -0.028 0.069
CEO MBA degree -0.051 0.026 † -0.004 0.064 0.019 0.101
Pct. independent directors -0.158 0.165 0.598 0.403 -0.176 0.627
Ownership concentration -0.134 0.110 -0.189 0.277 -0.206 0.418
Financial leverage 0.100 0.053 † 0.024 0.128 -0.398 0.202 *
Visibility -0.010 0.154 -0.877 0.398 * 0.611 0.585
List age -0.029 0.013 *** 0.270 0.051 *** -0.092 0.019 ***
Firm size 0.027 0.013 * 0.060 0.031 † -0.185 0.051 ***
Firm ROA 0.529 0.121 *** 0.078 0.297 1.770 0.465 ***
Share price 0.003 0.001 *** 0.008 0.002 *** 0.038 0.003 ***
Overall level of CSR 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 †
High-status houses coverage 0.078 0.055 0.134 0.087
Constant 0.423 0.150 ** 2.468 0.377 *** 3.369 0.575 ***
No. of Observations 3230 3203 3224
Adjusted R-Square 0.66 　 　 0.54 　 　 0.79 　 　
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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